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Abstract  
Activities and initiatives of co-creation are traditionally seen as a way for organizations to gain value 
through the involvement of certain actors in their environment. We notice an implicit assumption in 
current theoretical conceptualizations that co-creation is initiated and driven exclusively by 
organizations. However, it appears that co-creation activities may also be driven by third-party actors 
outside organizations. Based on interviews and secondary data from a public transport company in 
Stockholm, Sweden, we noticed that third party developers of services, that gained a large and diverse 
user base, were driving co-creation activities with the respective organization. Subsequently, based on 
our findings, we introduce the term "crowdpushing" to denote externally driven co-creation activities 
and frame four propositions to describe how co-creation activities are motivated and driven. Our 
findings contribute to a broader understanding of co-creation and have implications for its design and 
deployment.   
Keywords: Co-creation, Crowdpushing, Innovation, Open Data, Third Party Development, Public 
transport. 
1 Introduction   
In February 2009, a swift decision was made at a Stockholm-based public transport company to halt 
their web site deployment due to a perceived on-going denial-of-service (DOS) attack which has 
persisted since the new web site went public. Further investigation revealed that the source of the 
server overload was not a deliberate attack, but rather a non-sanctioned travel planning application 
that was utilized by thousands of users and heavily relied on the no longer available formatting of the 
previous web site design. Subsequently, once the previous web site design was restored, the gadget 
resumed normal behaviour and the problems ceased. This incident stimulated the present study by 
raising questions such as what forces were at play to cause this situation? How did such massive 
activity pass under the radar of the company? Could the company anticipate and avoid the 
widespread unauthorized reuse of its data? Should the company encourage such co-creative 
activities?  
Openness and exchange are inherent in co-creative approaches to digital innovation. Co-creation in the 
context of organizations and people is often seen as an organizational initiative that aims to gain 
competitive advantage through the involvement of a certain type of actor in organizational processes. 
The involvement of people may have different exchange formats and outcomes. For example, in co-
production, people co-produce the product or service that they consume in exchange for added degrees 
of freedom. However in crowdsourcing, people provide organizations with new useful ideas in 
exchange for some monetary or immaterial rewards.  So far, co-creation has often been seen as a joint 
activity in which organizations lead and people follow. In contrast, this paper describes an emerging 
variant of co-creation in which actors in the environment lead and organizations follow.  
In what follows, we report on a study of distributed involvement in innovation at a public transport 




that it was shaped to a large extent by the use patterns and on-going engagement of numerous clients 
who utilized "unauthorized" applications that were built by independent third-party developers who 
found ways to construct services which better fitted the users' needs. This finding was unanticipated 
considering the common expectation that open data or any co-creation initiatives are led by the host 
organization which tend to remain in control over the process, as in any other planned strategic 
manoeuvre. In this case, however, in spite of the initial strategic intent of the organization to curtail 
and if possible to thwart third-party attempts to reappropriate the company's data, hundreds of 
thousands of users who chose to rely on non-sanctioned services in their everyday life created a 
crowd-based thrust that forced the company to give in and to provide open and unrestricted access to 
portions of their data.   
In view of the current literature that portrays co-creation exclusively as an internally-driven strategic 
choice, where organizations actively approach actors in their environment and get them engaged in 
some joint activities, our observations suggest that we need to assess and conceptualize an alternative 
type of co-creation that is externally-driven by third party actors who are backed and supported by an 
engaged user base crowd. To this end we bring forward the notion of crowdpushing. We define 
crowdpushing as a coercive public demand that  compels an organization to engage 
with external  interested part ies in anticipated acts of co-creat ion. We argue that 
crowdpushing is enabled by the ubiquity of mobile devices, related platforms and wireless data 
networks and that it is contingent on the emergence of third party actors who have an interest in 
developing interfaces to the organization's resources. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: we first review the related literature on the 
relationship between organizations and crowds in the context of co-creation. Next, based on interviews 
and secondary data, we present a case study of crowdpushing. Building on our findings, we offer a set 
of propositions that differentiate between internally and externally driven acts of co-creation and 
conclude by suggesting implications for practice. 
2 Theoretical background 
A major theme within contemporary organizational research is concerned with how organizational 
boundaries are opened for exchange and how user value is co-created to a greater extent with a wide 
set of actors (Prahalad & Ramaswamy, 2004; Normann & Ramirez, 1993). In order to be successful, 
co-creation must provide increased value for all involved parties. Therefore, understanding the key to 
co-creation success must draw on the motivations of the relevant stakeholders to engage in the process. 
These motivations may be placed on a continuum that spans from gaining a concrete finite reward to 
gaining a capability or affordance (Figure 1). For example, whereas crowdsourcing illustrates a 
reward-based motivation on one hand, smartphones, web 2.0 services, and open-data initiatives 
illustrate affordances-based motivation on the other hand. Naturally, there are instances in between 
these two poles, such as living labs (Bergvall-Kareborn et al., 2009) that are partly motivated by 
gaining rewards and partly by gaining affordances.  
 




Rewards-based motivation refers to both economic value as well as immaterial value. For example a 
quite spectacular rewards-based co-creative relationship can be observed in crowdsourcing (Howe, 
2006), in which organizations draw on the value produced by a collective intelligence (Surowiecki, 
2005). Through platforms like Innocentive and Top Coder, organizations are given access to an 
abundant set of independent contributors, where even marginal contributors are able to provide them 
with otherwise unattainable knowledge (Jeppesen & Lakhani, 2010). In crowdsourcing, organizations 
typically initiate a ‘broadcast search’ by disclosing information about the problem at hand and inviting 
solutions from anyone who can solve it (Jeppesen & Lakhani, 2010). As individual members of the 
crowd submit potential solutions, the organization rewards (financially or through other means) the 
providers of those solutions that they find the most appropriate. Thus, in crowdsourcing the 
organization retains the control over how to proceed with the suggested solutions. In this sense, 
crowdsourcing seems - when it works - to take the best out of two worlds by drawing on the collective 
wisdom of the crowd while maintaining control over how the proposed ideas and solutions are used.  
While research on crowdsourcing has highlighted how rewards-based co-creation works in favour of 
organizations, we see other, more continuous approaches to co-creation. The affordances-based 
motivation refers to co-creation of a capability of some sort, e.g. the ability to co-design and customize 
a service such as a smartphone. Even though a smartphone is sold to the customer in a fully 
operational default state, its design allows major modification (Germonprez et al., 2007). Thus, after 
obtaining a smartphone, the typical user often engages in a secondary design process in which s/he 
modifies the smartphone by applying personalized settings, applications or even operating systems. 
The design of smartphones allows any user to co-produce the service for it to meet situated and 
emergent needs (Germonprez, et al., 2011). Affordances-based motivation may also be the ability to 
co-create content, e.g. through web 2.0 applications. For instance, by using a wiki-based 
documentation for frequently asked questions about a product or service, users are able to add or alter 
substantial information based on their personal experiences (Wagner & Majchrzak, 2006). 
Furthermore, affordance based motivation may be the ability to view and modify data (Kuk & Davies, 
2011). One example is Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) that enable organizations to 
provide third party developers with programmable interfaces to their data repositories. Through this 
structured data access organizations encourage and empower third party developers to co-produce new 
services which may use data in unanticipated contexts or visualized it in an innovative way (Kuk & 
Davies, 2011). 
While existing theoretical conceptualizations of co-creation have emphasized motivation as an 
important dimension of co-creation, next we present our empirical investigation which revealed 
driving force or thrust as another critical dimension in understanding co-creation activities.  
3 Research Method 
Case studies are suitable in particular for the exploratory research of a complex phenomenon that 
requires in-depth on-site investigation (Dubé and Paré, 2003). We investigated the underlying 
phenomenon using the case study method. More specifically, we used a single exploratory case study 
to explore a novel and underexplored phenomenon. As we have yet to see theoretical 
conceptualisations of crowd-driven approaches to co-creation, building on Yin (2009) and Darke et al. 
(1998), we find a single exploratory case study to be a suitable approach. 
The focal organization in this paper is Storstockholms lokaltrafik which we label here Stockholm 
public transport company (SPTC). SPTC is owned by the county council of Stockholm and has a 
board of politicians. SPTC holds the overall responsibility for infrastructure, ticketing and customer 
information about the public transport network. SPTC’s main operations have been subcontracted 
since 1993 to bus, train, metro and light-rail operators such as Veolia Transport and MTR Corporation. 
On a daily basis 700 000 customers make use of the transport network of SPTC. Together with other 
public transport companies in Sweden, SPTC owns the Association for Public Transport Companies 




We chose to study SPTC because it demonstrated a case of crowdpushing. Through a variety of data 
sources we were able to follow the process in which SPTC has turned its approach to data access from 
a strictly controlled policy to open access with very few restrictions, and how this change was 
influenced by public demand. Furthermore, access to data and intimate knowledge the target 
organization, which is crucial in case study research, was secured by one of the authors who was a 
previous employee of SPTC. Overall, data included interview transcripts and internal documents such 
as presentations, e-mail conversations and other relevant documents as described in Table 1.  
Respondents were selected both from personnel who worked at the target organization during the time 
period studied and from companies and individuals who tried to gain access to company data from 
SPTC during this period of time. In order to select a relevant set of respondents, the authors initially 
identified four phases of the process within the organization. Potential respondents relevant for each 
phase were identified and put into the initial set of respondents. Most of the respondents were 
identified as relevant to more than one phase. In total 13 semi-structured interviews were conducted 
using a pre-crafted interview protocol. To elicit the respondents’ views on the unfolding of the 
organizational shift of perspectives regarding open data and cooperation with third party developers, 
the interview started with broad questions in this vein. To further understand the details of this 
process, a number of significant events related to the relevant phases were then brought up and 
discussed in detail.  
All interviews have been audio taped and transcribed. All transcribed audio material and reports have 
been coded using Atlas.ti, a data analysis software package. Transcribed utterances and other text 
materials addressing the scope of research have been identified and coded accordingly. Given the 
disruptive nature of the changed policy, we approached the data analysis through a lens of punctuated 
change (Newman & Lyytinen, 2008). Such a lens allows researchers to understand critical incidents 
(Flanagan, 1954) which significantly alter socio-technical trajectories within the studied setting and 
the interventions the organization initiates as a response (Newman & Lyytinen, 2008).  
The data collection approach used had some limitations. The potential number of relevant respondents 
was limited because only a small fraction of the employees at the company were engaged in the 
phenomenon under investigation. To enhance the limited number of respondents, the initial set of 
respondents was complemented by a snowball sample (Sarantakos, 1998), that is, at the end of each 
interview, the respondents were asked to name other persons who may be able to contribute to the 
study. In order to reduce problems related to selective descriptions or problems in recalling certain 
actions relevant to the story, we also triangulated the interviews with historical e-mails and documents 
from the company (Eisenhardt, 1989). Equipped with a priori knowledge based on these documents 
before conducting the interviews, we were able to bring up events not mentioned by the respondent at 
the end of the interview in order to refresh the respondent’s memory.  
Data Type N Data Source Description  
Interviews 8 Interviews at SPTC with Head of the Passenger Information Dept Head of 
Internet services, IT-project manager, Business developer, IT-system 
administrator, Head of Business Development, IT-system administrator, IT-
controller 
Interviews 3 Interviews at APTC with CEO, CIO and  Head of Business Development  
Interviews 2 Interviews with third party developer of the two leading smartphone 
applications  
Documents 16 E-mail conversations at SPTC 
Documents 5 Presentation material of SPTC 
Document 1 Strategy document of SPTC 
Usage statistics  2 Detailed usage statistics for the two leading applications 




4 Crowdpushing at work: The case of Stockholm Public Transport 
The analysis of the case data revealed four key phases (each triggered by critical events) related to 




Description  Critical Event           (leads to) SPTC Organizational Response 
Dynamic travel data becomes available to 
the public via the company website 
(mobil.sl.se, personalized services, real-time 
information)  
All customers were referred to the web 




services go live 
Subsequent requests of third-party 
developers for data access  
Denial of all requests and development of 
a clear policy aiming to control directly 







The emergence and increasing adoption of 
unauthorized third party services 
No organizational response. Services 
developed by third party developers are 
ignored. 
Web services malfunction due to apparent 
Denial of Service (DoS) attack following 
architectural change of the company 
website 
Launching investigation to identify the 
source of attack and to develop proper 






Discovering that the source of malfunction 
is not DoS attack, but rather unsanctioned 
applications used by thousands of clients  
Attempting to bind the third party 
developers with legal agreement 
Realizing that the company has not been 
successful in binding third party developers, 
and that with no legal leverage the only 
workable solution to regain control is 
through the provision of a public API 
Changing data access policy and 
reaching out to third party developers 





Open access to 
data 
Third party developers adopt the newly 
available API 
Promoting the services provided by third 
party developers and embracing the 
developers as part of their provision of 
information 
Table 2. Summary of the critical incidents  
4.1 First phase: “We want them to come to www.sl.se” 
The delivering of timely and relevant information assisting travellers to go from point A to B has been 
a core mission for the SPTC for decades. In the late 1990’s the company began a series of large and 
visionary IT projects aiming to provide functionality such as interactive journey planning, real-time 
departure information and disruption information. Among the services offered was a mobile website 
(mobil.sl.se), ability to save preconfigured trips and favourite stations on the web site and a real-time 
web page for computer desktops. The main hub (signs at bus stops and stations excluded) through 




 “It was made in the traditional way, systems for presenting information at our own webpage and our 
own signs, and everything had to be huge and big. We were building space rockets, and then things 
takes a lot of time.” (Head of Internet services, SPTC) 
 As the project progressed a growing interest from external parties emerged. Typically they wished to 
present information about public transport through alternative media channels. For instance the largest 
yellow pages service in Sweden wished to publish the location of bus stops in their map service. 
However, these proposals were refused and pushed back: 
 “Several parties got in touch to me and expressed that they wanted to build things with our data, and 
that they wanted to cooperate with us. It was this and that, everything from screens at refrigerator 
doors to very local travel planners. […] I was pretty quick to say no to them since we didn’t have the 
resources, technology nor the right type of thinking for that kind of collaboration.” (Head of Internet 
services, SPTC) 
 The internal strategy not to provide information to external partners was motivated in terms of 
control. If other parties were to create their own services SPTC would lose control over how the 
information was presented to passengers which, in the case of e.g. incorrect information, could lead to 
dissatisfied customers and ambiguities with regard to the company trademark. Further, allowing free 
access would contradict other goals such as potentially selling the information in the future: 
 “We were afraid of how our information was presented when we have no control over it. [...] We just 
wanted them [our customers] to come to www.sl.se” (IT-controller SPTC) 
“Well, it was like some policy at SPTC that we did not want to share any information, since someone 
else could then do something that was better than what we provided.” IT-system administrator SPTC 
In September 2007 APTC, initiated an export of data (including data from SPTC) to Google, thereby 
making nationwide coordinates of bus stops and stations in Sweden available through Google Maps. 
SPTC reacted promptly and contacted APTC in order to clarify that SPTCs data were not to be 
distributed to third parties. At this stage, the strategy was clear and firm – SPTC did not accept other 
parties to present information about public transport in Stockholm.  
“[SPTC] watched a presentation where Google showed their information, and the reaction was like 
‘How the hell did you get this information?’.  And when they answered ‘Through APTC’ the ball was 
set in motion. [...] It was then that SPTC showed that as soon as something happened that was beyond 
their control, in any other channel or by someone else, it was all negative. It was one hundred percent 
‘What the hell, we don’t have any control over this, so we'll put an end to this.’ It was reflex behaviour 
that ‘this must be removed, remove it immediately!’" (CEO, the Swedish Association for Public 
Transport Companies) 
“Suddenly we had become side-lined by our own service company that we paid fees to, and afterwards 
we are told that they basically have signed a commercial contract [with Google]. Then my eyes 
started to glow, I can tell you that.” (Business developer, SPTC) 
As APTC was controlled by formal agreements and through ownership it was possible for SPTC to 
regain control over how information from SPTC was used and the export to Google ceased.   
4.2 Second phase: "We've lost control" 
During 2008 a growing number of external services suddenly appeared. In spite of the policy at SPTC 
that information about public transport was not to be provided through external parties, these 
unsanctioned services gained a large user base. The services were created without any permission 
from SPTC and the information for those services was screen scraped (extracting selected parts from 
SPTC’s webpage) from existing services provided at the company website. For example, information 
from the journey planner system and the real-time information system started to appear through a 




Macintosh computers. The most popular application for iPhone was distributed through Apple App 
Store and became available to iPhone users for the first time on November 9th 2008 and rapidly 
gained a large number of users. The application was created by a student in Stockholm as a hobby 
project, without any formal agreements with SPTC.  
“The fact is that this is something of a hobby project so we felt like it’s fun to do something, not to get 
involved and try to get into various agreements to the right and left. So then I solved the problem so to 
speak. [...] It worked great. [...] I have thought that if one has a fairly large user base it's not as easy 
to dismiss my application with ‘no, but we do not want anyone else to access or view our 
information’” (The developer of the leading iPhone application) 
For Android a number of services emerged in a similar way, and in this case too it happened without 
prior permission from SPTC. The most popular service for Android was called “STHLM Traveling” 
“It was pretty straight forward because I lived outside Stockholm, so I needed to have something that 
took me from point A to B when I was in the city. And something that was quick and easy and so that I 
did not have to go through the website. [...] In a simple and intuitive way really. That was my 
motivation to build it and that is what it still is. [...] That many people used it and got in touch was 
extremely fun.“ (The developer of the leading Android application) 
As SPTC became aware of the new services available and the screen-scrape technology used for 
getting data, different types of actions were discussed internally. One application was investigated 
from a legal perspective regarding data ownership and trademarks, but no action was taken.  
“I think people were a bit shocked actually, ‘Oh, we've lost control’" (IT-project manager, SPTC) 
“Suddenly we became aware that this is something that is ongoing and it has been ongoing for several 
years but we did not know about it. Well, knew about, that's no secret that they did but there was just 
nobody at [SPTC] who had reflected upon that they did it.” (Head of Business Development, SPTC) 
As the external services increased in popularity and use, without SPTC taking any action, it became 
more and more apparent within the organization that the prior position not to share information was 
unsustainable:  
“We thought that whatever action we took, it was not possible to stop this in the long run. [...] The 
only way to gain value to our brand was to make data available.” (Head of Passenger Information 
Department, SPTC) 
4.3 Third phase: “We had to write adapters and my God what misery it was.” 
One of the new services, externally developed without permission from SPTC, was programmed to get 
information from the real-time information system on a regular basis. However, if the information was 
not delivered within a certain timeframe, the system was again asked the question. This bad way of 
handling errors in the code of the gadget, together with an extensive distribution of the gadget through 
the Microsoft Windows Vista Gadget gallery, created a critical situation for SPTC. When the real-time 
information system was slow in answering requests, this resulted in a large number of questions from 
the Gadgets distributed to thousands of computers running Microsoft Windows Vista. This could for 
example occur in the case of bad weather conditions with a large number of passengers searching for 
information or when new internal systems were deployed at SPTC.  
“We noticed that there were problems with the real time information for the commuter train, and that 
the database server suddenly went into high gear as the CPU was like running at like one hundred 
percent. Then we started to explore a little bit and found out that it was this gadget that caused 
problems. We saw that it made a lot of calls because it sent a parameter that we normally do not use. 
The gadgets are all open source so we could see that the gadget sent the parameter. And in this way 
we could reduce the number of requests to the database. Then everything was okay for a while, until it 




new interface of the company webpage, even though we were entrusted with a very powerful server 
environment. The complete webpage went down just eight, nine hours after launch and it took very 
long time until we really could deduce the whole thing and fix it. So I mean of course it has cost the 
company an enormous amount of money.” (IT-system administrator SPTC) 
As a consequence of the issues with the externally developed services, an internal process was 
initiated to formulate a new strategy. Formally, this process consisted of three workshops ending up 
with a strategic document named “Guidelines for cooperation on passenger information”. This 
document stated that SPTC should now reach out to external developers in order to manage the 
external channels and services. The new strategy nevertheless came with restrictions on usage and 
who could use the information. All external requests should be handled and matched up against certain 
criteria, retaining some control on SPTC’s behalf. The document also highlights the importance of the 
SPTC Trademark and that SPTC should be presented as provider of the information in the third party 
services. The new guidelines were decided in the management team after some discussions about the 
economic value of the information:  
“We really thought for a while that we had a commercial opportunity. That we could sell this 
information. [...] It was this sudden awakening when we realized that, first we thought that we could 
get paid for this, and yes the people out there was very much interested in it. But if we demanded 
payment, [people] would ensure that they had access to that information anyway. To think that we 
could sell it, the idea was useless. They would just get the information from the journey planner at all 
times anyway.” (Head of Business Development, SPTC) 
The consequence of the new strategy was that developers of existing screen scraping applications 
would sign agreements with SPTC. Hence, the developers of the most popular applications were 
contacted and had to sign an agreement in order to prevent SPTC from taking legal actions.  
“We came to meet SPTC and started talking. [...] It was of course long, big contracts with many 
things we had to sign. [...] There were requirements for how the information would be distributed [...] 
‘You may only use it for a travel planner’ and all that. I felt that it was much about trying to protect so 
that someone else not could get the data. [...] It was not allowed to store anything on the [users’] 
phone and so on. [...] It prevented me from doing stuff that I wanted to do.” (The developer of the 
leading Android application) 
Nevertheless, even though SPTC had opened up the possibility of getting information by signing an 
agreement, new problems occurred. Firstly, it was not possible to provide a good technical solution 
replacing the screen scraping technique.  
“It was well-sealed containers, I would say. Then we had to create the APIs in retrospect for a system 
that was not really built for APIs. We had to write adapters and my God what a misery that was.” 
(Business developer, SPTC) 
Secondly, the new strategy required considerable overhead to manage a growing number of 
agreements as well as an increasing number of technical questions raised by external developers - it 
was difficult to design an organization that could serve external requests in line with the demands.  
“I think that what I feel I've missed it is actually a good regular contact with SPTC. [...] ’Pity that it 
did not work but we got it on Monday’ and just ‘Okay’.  They shut down the office on Friday afternoon 
and it feels like you want to say ‘Yes, but come on, there are many people out there using these APIs’” 
(The developer of the leading Android application) 
4.4 Fourth phase: “An initiative for open transport data” 
At the end of 2010 a joint project between the Swedish Association for Public Transport companies 
and SPTC was formulated. The aim of the project was to create a more sustainable and less time 
consuming way of distributing information to third party developers. At this time SPTC had signed 




existing and new relations, both with regard to technical solutions and the dialogue with the external 
developers. From the association’s point of view, the project was a project for the industry of public 
transport in Sweden, with a result that could be used by several of the owners of the association. In 
this case, it was also beneficial to communicate with developers as a united industry distributing open 
information about public transport in a common way for the whole of Sweden.  
“We had limited resources at the IT-department and the IT-department were concerned that if we 
were to do those things ourselves we would have to spend more time, have yet another one thing to 
manage, provide documentation etc. [...] It sounded like a brilliant idea to do this together with other 
companies that think in the same way.” (Head of Internet services, SPTC) 
“It's good to work together so that you get all those APIs under one roof so to speak. And also we can 
share a technical solution. [...] And then we do not ourselves need to go ahead and develop 
solutions.” (IT-system administrator SPTC) 
In September 2011 “Trafiklab.se -- an initiative for open transport data” was launched as a result of 
the joint project between the two organisations. The solution was described as an initiative to open up 
information about public transport in Sweden to external service developers. In the external 
communication about the initiative, external services like the leading application for iPhone are 
highlighted as examples of what can be achieved when opening up information.  
 “-[The most popular iPhone application] is a prime example of that is not necessarily we at SPTC 
who best can produce useful digital services for travellers. We hope that this initiative will lead to 
many more smart services to accommodate different types of travellers, says [Head of Internet 
services, SPTC].” (Joint press release from the association and SPTC, September 12 2011) 
At www.trafiklab.se it is possible to access the information from SPTC and get documentation by 
registering an account directly at the website as well as the possibility of posting questions and 
providing feedback to SPTC.  Merely one week after launching trafiklab.se more than 160 third party 
developers had registered in order to get access to the API’s (to be compared with the 25 legal 
agreements the approach in phase 3 had rendered).  
5 Discussion 
As stated in the introduction of this paper, one objective of the study was to solidify and extend 
knowledge about the drivers of co-creation. Whereas the current literature portrays co-creation 
exclusively as an internally-driven strategic choice, where organizations actively approach actors in 
their environment and engage them in some joint activities, the case of SPTC suggests that we need to 
assess and conceptualize an alternative type of co-creation that is externally driven by third party 
actors who are backed and supported by an engaged user base crowd. In other words, we can broaden 
our understanding of co-creation based on the identification of the driving force that propels the 
resulting joint activity, or the directionality of its thrust which may be internally or externally driven.  
To that end, Figure 1 can be extended with an additional thrust dimension. As described earlier in the 
paper, based on the literature, the motivation to engage in co-creation activities can be seen on a 
continuum from rewards (e.g. crowdsourcing) to affordances (e.g. co-produced services). However, 
our case data underline that the thrust – i.e. the propelling force of co-creation activity – can also be 
driven by entities located outside the boundaries of an organization and beyond its control. Figure 2 
portrays the revised space of co-creation activities that includes both the motivation and thrust 






 Figure 2. Co-creation as a product of thrust and motivation 
The most frequently described co-creation activities are driven by organizations and motivated by 
rewards. For example, crowd participation in crowdsourcing is motivated by the rewards offered in the 
challenge (Jeppesen & Lakhani, 2010). This observation leads to our first proposition: 
Proposition 1: Internally driven reward based co-creation is likely to be successful 
The SPTC case data suggest that we cannot apply a similar proposition to affordances based co-
creation. In contrast, we find several examples in our dataset of how organizationally driven co-
produced services failed. For example, even though SPTC offered mobile services through its mobile 
web site, people with smartphones seemed to abandon these organisationally offered services and 
instead turn to unsanctioned services offering additional affordances. Further, as SPTC eventually 
acknowledged that they needed to establish relationships with third-party developers, they initially 
approached them with unacceptably stiff legalistic. As a consequence, most of the third party 
developers simply ignored SPTC and continued to use unsanctioned data channels.  
Whereas in the case of SPTC, internally driven affordances based co-creation failed, the literature 
exhibits several instances of co-produced services where such internally developed technology is 
rolled out successfully to end-users and able to serve situated needs (Germonprez et al., 2007; 2011). 
We suggest that success in instances of affordances based co-creation depends on thrust and user base 
complexity. As illustrated in the literature, organizationally driven affordances based co-creation 
within the realm of a particular technology (e.g. a single platform) and a more uniform user base 
population is likely to be successful. However, as more new platforms emerge and the user base 
population becomes more diverse, the host organization (as demonstrated in the case of SPTC) simply 
cannot meet the diverse technical as well as functionality demands of the market population. 
Subsequently, failing to meet the diverse needs has far-reaching consequences that result in failure. 
This leads to the second and third propositions:   
Proposition 2: Internally driven affordances based co-creation for homogenous user 
populations is likely to be successful 
Proposition 3: Internally driven affordances based co-creation for heterogeneous user 




Finally, externally driven affordance based co-creation is likely to be successful. As revealed in our 
observations, third party developers and the crowd compelled the company to engage in co-creation 
(as happened with the establishment of trafiklab.se). The SPTC case also suggests that the external 
forces were mobilised effectively only as the user base became more heterogeneous and the demands 
more complex. This leads to the fourth and last proposition: 
Proposition 4: Externally driven affordances based co-creation for heterogeneous user 
populations is likely to be successful 
5.1 Implications for practice 
The results of the study provide several insights for the design of co-creative activities. Organizations 
who wish to deploy co-creative activities need to identify and acknowledge the motivation of the 
target population. Motivations may run from finite reward-based incentives to the acquisition of 
perpetual affordances. Further, successful deployment of co-creation activities requires an a priori 
understanding of the nature and level of complexity of the target population. Based on the study, we 
suggest the following: In cases in which the target population is motivated mainly by rewards, the 
design and execution of the co-creation activity can be driven by the host organization. Similarly, if 
the target population is motivated by affordances and the user base population is relatively 
homogenous in terms of functionality needs and technology in use, again the organization may drive 
the effort in increasing value for involved parties. However, if the target population is motivated by 
affordances and the user base population is relatively heterogeneous – that is, it has diverse 
functionality needs and it utilizes diverse platforms – then intense involvement of third party 
developers in designing and orchestrating the co-creation activities is critical for their success. Overall, 
and particularly in the cases of heterogeneous user base, partnering with external third parties, drawing 
on their resourcefulness, and including them in the value chain of the co-creation activities may offer 
substantive benefits to the host organization that subsequently can partially or fully withdraw from 
dealing with end-user capabilities. For example, in our case, SPTC has stopped developing all 
smartphone applications, yet the company is able to serve successfully the current diverse user base of 
mobile devices.  
Any successful co-creation endeavour is based upon establishing win-win relationships between all 
parties involved. In crowdpushing, where by design third party developers take a dominant proactive 
role, the available resources at the organizational boundary play an important role in establishing such 
relationships. This is a critical point and organizations must pay careful attention to designing 
interfaces that cater to the third party developers' needs and to the appropriation of the necessary 
resources that allow them to serve the user base and to create value for all. Moreover, as demonstrated 
by the SPTC case, organizations need not only to understand the incentives and to meet the needs of 
the co-creators, but also to refrain from posing unnecessary restrictions and constraints. Failure to do 
so may not only hamper co-creation but also steer away the independent developers towards 
alternative and unsanctioned resources. In summary, we believe that the key to successful co-creation 
activities lies in an active, reciprocal dialogue that provides a basis for win-win relationship among all 
stakeholders.  
6 Conclusions 
We have explored the drivers of co-creation and the relationship between an organization and its co-
creating crowd. Building on single-case data from a Swedish public transport company, we found that 
co-creation as an activity can be driven by forces external to the organization, something that has so 
far gone unnoticed in the literature. Subsequently, we introduced the notion of crowdpushing, a type of 
co-creation that is externally-driven by third party actors that are backed and supported by an engaged 




a need for further explorative studies on crowd-led co-creation activities, as well as rigorous testing of 
the hypotheses presented in this paper. Moreover, we see a need to reach a deeper understanding of 
how to design the resources necessary to support successful crowdpushing activities. 
Given what we witnessed in the SPTC case, crowdpushing may lay bare entirely new possibilities in 
which an organization can help in creating value for their customers. Nevertheless, while we can 
envision the possibilities that crowdpushing might bring, we do not maintain that crowdpushing is the 
only mechanism in play in the context of co-creation. Rather, we hold that anticipating crowdpushing 
and designing for it ahead of time can mitigate some pitfalls in the deployment of co-creation 
activities, let alone being a source of much value for all.  
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